The Search for a Mobile Launcher for the Minuteman III ICBM: Implications and Challenges

Understanding the strategic importance of mobile launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is crucial in today's nuclear landscape. This article explores why the United States Air Force (USAF) has not developed a mobile launcher for the Minuteman III ICBM and evaluates the implications and challenges faced during this pursuit. The focus is on historical context, technological constraints, and current strategic considerations.

Historical Context and Strategic Importance

During the Cold War, the U.S. sought to develop an extremely survivable mobile ballistic missile system for its ICBMs. One of the most successful systems was the Ohio-class submarines equipped with Trident II D5 missiles, demonstrating the effectiveness of submarine basing over land-based systems.

With the Minuteman III ICBM, the situation was different. The Minuteman III, a silo-based missile, became vulnerable due to its MIRV (Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle) configuration. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union/Russia could conceivably destroy more Minuteman III warheads than anticipated, creating a 'warhead magnet' scenario. This was especially problematic given the high warhead counts of the Peacekeeper missile, which required approximately 2 warheads per silo for a high probability of destruction.

Exploration of Basing Modes

During the 1980s, the U.S. investigated a broad range of ICBM basing modes, ranging from silo-based to submarine-based systems. The objective was to find a practical way to make MIRVed ICBMs survivable. However, no solution was found that adequately addressed the survivability issue.

The development of mobile basing for ICBMs presented significant challenges, including the stress it placed on the missile and the high costs associated with personnel and maintenance. As a result, the Peacekeeper missiles, with their 10 warheads, were eventually placed in silos, transforming them into 'warhead magnets' despite the best efforts to improve their survivability.

Current Strategic Considerations

The recent reduction in allowable warhead counts due to arms control treaties such as SORT and New START has further diminished the need for a mobile launcher for the Minuteman III ICBM. With the current allowable warhead count of 1550 on 700 delivery systems, the U.S. now places a single warhead on each Minuteman missile. This single-warhead configuration significantly reduces the ICBM's attractiveness as a strategic asset and diminishes the need for a mobile launcher.

The submarine fleet has become the preferred method of deployment for most warheads, due to its inherent survivability and effectiveness in a nuclear conflict. This shift reflects a strategic decision to focus resources on more robust and survivable platforms.

Furthermore, even with a single warhead per ICBM, the Minuteman III is no longer a warhead magnet. An attacker's best strategy would involve using as many warheads as are destroyed, negating the value of the attack.

Conclusion

The search for a mobile launcher for the Minuteman III ICBM encountered significant challenges due to the inherent vulnerabilities of MIRVed ICBMs. Historical context, technological constraints, and current strategic considerations have led to the conclusion that a mobile launcher is not a viable solution for the Minuteman III. Instead, the U.S. has focused on other, more robust and survivable platforms, such as the submarine fleet, to ensure nuclear deterrence in the modern era.